Abstract
alongside organized labor-led conflicts over the expansion and subsequent removal of "social" limits to the market. Elite political actors negotiated Ireland's transformation by relocating both market and family law conflicts to the non-majoritarian, expert domain of judicial review and EU treaty formation. Neoformal modes of legal thought, invoking abstract but positively enacted values embedded in domestic constitutions and international treaties, helped to legitimate this process and its results.
Diverse but limited changes to the Irish Constitution occurred through amendment via popular referendum and through judicial review. The Irish Courts generally reproduced "classic" constitutional forms, emphasising individualism, anti-statism, and "negative liberties" (including private property rights) ahead of communitarian norms, the interests of the "common good" or "positive" rights to welfare. Nevertheless, neoformal "human rights" conflicts have been fought in Irish and European courts by or on behalf of women, children, prisoners, gays, Travellers, asylum seekers, the disabled and the transgendered among others. These groups have successfully combined litigation with civil society activism to challenge repressive norms and expand collective freedoms. After the 2007 crisis, neoliberalism and associated modes of legal thought remain hegemonic. Their rapidly reduced and declining legitimacy, however, presents opportunities for anti-systemic movements as well as for more democratic, more egalitarian constitutional projects.
Co-constitutive Transformation: Law, Society and History
We might divide the numerous works addressing constitutional development into "formalist" and "instrumentalist" accounts (Bourdieu 1987) . Towards the formalist pole are those who consider constitutions to be autonomous from society and see in constitutional law self-contained principles developed through formal reasoning. Such jurisprudential analyses comprise the majority of recently published research on constitutions (Stone Sweet 2011) . Towards the instrumentalist pole, conversely, are those who view constitutional law as registering and reproducing society's prevailing values, institutions or interests. Cultural contextualists examine whether constitutions are congruent with broader social norms. Functionalist accounts emphasize how constitutions relate to a wider, often pre-existing institutional context and underline the relationship between constitutions, state-building and state legitimacy. Finally, interest-based accounts emphasize the wider social relations or constellations of power that determine constitutional development.
Collectively, this body of scholarship's theoretical assumptions are questionable. On the one hand, formalist and culturalist accounts often accord the law primacy to other social phenomena and assume the state to be a neutral site of contestation between competing interests, thereby misrecognising the violent, "de-sacralised" nature of state practices (Congost 2003) . On the other, in dismissing as "ideological," "superstructural" or otherwise "epiphenomenal" the jwsr.org | http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.603 structure of constitutional forms, functionalist and interest-based accounts risk emptying their analyses of the specific role of the legal field in the reproduction of those power relations that they claim to reveal (Fine 1985) . Ultimately, the central point of contention here -the law's autonomy within society -cannot be resolved a priori but must itself be interrogated in terms of its emergence from particular historical conditions and previous social struggles (Bourdieu 1987: 815) . The field's dominant methodologies are also problematic. Traditionally, constitutional studies used single-country case-studies to the detriment of wider comparison (Hirschl 2007) .
While comparative constitutional studies are now resurgent, the problem with both single and multiple case-study approaches is that the hermetic isolation of nation-states remains assumed.
Scholars thus tend to attribute to internal dynamics changes happening in strictly analogous ways in other jurisdictions (Kennedy 2006: 25) . Recently, alternative "global" accounts of constitutional development have emerged, emphasising commonalities among diverse constitutions in terms of the transnational migration of constitutional ideas (Tushnet 2009: 3-17) . A world-systems analysis of constitutional development gives critical expression to this emergent intellectual trajectory, potentially resolving its outstanding theoretical and methodological problems in a more coherent analytic synthesis.
The present analysis thus accords constitutions neither primacy nor epiphenomenality.
Rather, by critiquing and synthesising the various insights of both formalist and instrumentalist analyses, it seeks to account for the development of constitutional forms in terms of their forming part of "a rich totality of many determinations and relations" (Marx 1996a: 146) . Specifically, it is considered possible here to acknowledge the production of constitutional norms and discourses as part and parcel of wider legal and cultural transformations, while nevertheless insisting on understanding these developments within an overall frame of world-systemic inquiry, emphasising the development of the economic and inter-state world-system and anti-systemic politics (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 2011: 30 ; see also Harvey, 1989: 355) .
When considering this connection, it seems necessary to emphasize the manner in which the world-system of historical capitalism combined two key processes: the formation of an economic world-system and the formation of an inter-state world-system (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 2011: 30-3) . 4 This world-system produced a number of crucial antagonisms and corresponding anti-systemic movements, which may be divided, for analytical purposes only, into 82 jwsr.org http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.603
"social" and "national" tendencies. 5 Over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rulers' concessions to and, later, the triumph of popular, organized social and national movements underpinned the emergence of the modern nation-state, combining representative democracy with social reforms. Similarly, this shifting balance of core-periphery and anti-systemic relations crystallized in the various constitutional forms emerging in the course of successive waves of constitution-making.
In this regard, the critical legal studies scholar, Duncan Kennedy (2006) , has forwarded an important periodization and geographical understanding of three overlapping "globalizations" of "classic" (1850-1930), "social" (1900-c.1970) and "neoformal" (c.1945 onwards) law and legal thought, each globalization understood as providing a broadly shared conceptual or justificatory vocabulary of socio-legal change (and not a one-size-fits-all model of law reform). Here, we might similarly distinguish the contested development of classic, social and neoformal forms of constitutionalism. In contrast to Kennedy's emphasis on Weberian rationalization processes, however, I wish to foreground the importance of anti-systemic struggles and movements to sociolegal transformation. In this manner, world-systems analysis not only incorporates the transnational nature of nation-states' constitutional transformations but more usefully accounts for their timing as well.
Constitutional Forms in the World-System: Classic, Social and Neoformal Briefly stated, "classic" constitutional forms co-emerged with the rapid development of the British Free Trade cycle of accumulation. In the wake of the 1848 Revolutions, classic constitutions registered wider "national" movement influences and claimed an organic unity between the state's fundamental law and the nation's essence or geist. Independence movements in the Habsburg, Ottoman, French and British Empires as well as unification advocates in Italy and Germany explicitly identified constitution-making with nation-state building (Thornhill 2013: 250) . Concomitantly, the widespread emergence of new forms of labor, factory workers in newly industrialising cores and farm workers in cash-cropping peripheries, stimulated the development of particular legal forms, notably the prioritization of contract law as well as of the individual as the central juristic subject (Kennedy 2006: 36) . Classic constitutions thus tended to register the primacy of private over public law and of property and contract. Politically, the democratic component of "national sovereignty" and "basic rights" forwarded in these constitutional projects was strictly limited. The French Constituent Assembly of 1848 most clearly illustrated this (Marx 1996b) . Initial drafts fused classic, liberal rights of property, free belief, education, and equality of access to public office with material rights to employment and decent living conditions. The "Party of Order's" brutal suppression of the Parisien workers, however, dictated the latter provisions' eradication.
Social constitutionalism coincided with the decline of British hegemony, the ascent of anti-systemic movements and the associated development of state capacities. Proponents of "social legal thought" redefined law as a purposive activity, thereby providing a justificatory vocabulary for state intervention to meet societal needs and to respond to collective, interdependent problems, including war, mass unemployment, urbanization, as well as financial regulation (Kennedy 2006: 48) . Public law now came to delimit private law while both international and domestic law regimes provided for increasing state intervention. In core countries, this took the form of legalising universal social insurance and need-based entitlements; in peripheries, labor and land reforms. Importantly, social constitutions retained classic constitutional rights, including guarantees of property and contract. Politically, the overarching goal was "class-abatement," limiting the appeal of revolutionary groups, particularly in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution, and preserving class-rule by means of limiting social polarization and ensuring social mobility (Marshall 1950: 32) . Comparable strategies underpinned the social provisions of the Mexican constitution (1917), the Wohlfahrtstaat principles of Germany's Weimar constitution (1919) and Roosevelt's proposals to introduce a second bill of socioeconomic rights to the U.S. constitution in the early 1940s (Sunstein 2004; Thornhill 2013: 287) .
Post-World War Two, the emergent U.S. Free Enterprise cycle of accumulation era occasioned the globalization of a third, hybrid mode of law and legal thought, "public law neoformalism" (1945 -) . For three decades, core countries witnessed unprecedented levels of economic and social development, a phenomenon commonly attributed to diverse forms of state intervention to ensure full employment, growth and citizens' welfare, founded on the class compromise between capital and organized labor (Harvey 2007: 10) . In both cores and peripheries, political elites faced with conflicting pressures of tradition and of modernization-in both market and family law-shifted resulting disputes away from the domain of electoral politics and turned to the judiciary to resolve them instead (Kennedy 2006: 70) . Constitutional courts' case-loads increasingly shifted from traditional business and property disputes towards important civil, political and socio-economic rights conflicts. In the United States, for instance, the Warren and Burger Supreme Courts introduced significant precedents concerning race and gender equality as well as criminal due process and electoral fairness (McKay 2009: 343-50 enabling actors to invoke "supposedly transcendent but also positively enacted values in constitutions or treaties," whether classic or social norms, to justify changing the status quo (Kennedy 2006: 64) .
The role of constitutional courts became even more significant as the U.S.-led cycle of accumulation underwent a profound crisis in the mid-1970s. Given the associated transformation of class forces, particularly the decomposition of organized labor as a class for itself and the ascendancy of corporate and financial power, a specifically "new" or neoliberal constitutionalism came to prominence within the broader "neoformal" mode of law and legal thought. In the post-1989 era of globalization, a robust, anti-majoritarian logic of property rights entrenchment, redefining the public sphere in more privatized and more commodified ways, has accompanied the expansion and deepening of international trade and investment rules (Gill 1995) . The European Court of Justice, for example, has been both neo-formalist and neo-liberal in its interpretation of the canonical "freedoms" of goods and persons in a single market, "pushing the project further and faster than the Member States had been prepared to go on their own" (Sweet Stone 2010: 5) . This logic has shaped the legal infrastructure of the WTO, EU and NAFTA as well as a range of national constitutions, notably those recently created in Eastern Europe and the Middle East but also, through judicial activism, those of much older standing (Peebles 1997; Go 2003; Walker 2013 ).
Ireland's Constitutions in the World-System
Ireland makes for a particularly useful country case-study of these socio-legal transformations. Its constitutional development blends a mix of socio-legal cultures-including a common law tradition in the Atlantic English-speaking orbit; a wider European or continental law tradition mediated by its legal intelligentsia and by the dominant position of the Catholic Church; and a semi-peripheral and post-colonial heritage that, notwithstanding its relative economic wealth and liberal democratic development, suggests commonalities with the experience of states in today's Global South. Comparatively speaking, however, the 1922 Irish Free State Constitution showed little trace of the robust social constitutionalism that characterized contemporary constitutionmaking in Mexico and Weimar Germany. Similarly, while the 1937 Irish Constitution incorporated a pronounced Catholic social discourse, it did so without expanding welfare rights or significantly altering the state's institutional make-up. Clarifying Irish exceptionalism here is a useful step towards understanding the subsequent reception and development of neoformal constitutionalism.
Scholarship on the Irish constitution, however, has yet to consider its development critically, specifically how it intersects with long-term structures, class interests or popular movements. The first wave of Irish constitutional studies, led by John Kelly (1967 ), Brian Farrell (1988 and Basil Chubb (1991) Hogan (2005) and Bill Kissane (2011) , has usefully contextualized Irish constitutionalism within wider European and Transatlantic traditions of constitution-making, the focus of this research continues to centre on the shifting intersection of liberal institutions and norms with nationalist and Catholic ones. In comparative constitutional studies, similarly, the Irish case is most readily forwarded as an example of a sociolegal order deeply expressive of and divided by questions of national identity (Tushnet 2009: 12 ). Chubb's thesis on the "normative force" of the Irish constitutional tradition, a basic law gradually adjusting to changing societal norms, remains the standard explanatory account of change (1991:117; Kissane 2011: xii) . Unlike existing studies, the key unit of analysis adopted here is not the Irish state or its constitution per se but rather the historical capitalist world-system. The present survey attempts to synthesize existing studies of Irish constitutionalism into a more coherent whole. In places, this has necessitated original analysis of archives and jurisprudence. The specific method of inquiry has been to analyse and contextualize within the world-system the actions and discourses of actors involved in creating the 1922 Irish Free State Constitution and the 1937 Irish Constitution as well as those involved in referendums and judicial review cases important to the constitution's subsequent development (See Fairclough 2003) . Hence, the Irish "case" is not explained in terms of "internal" factors such as constitution makers' "innate conservatism" (See Farrell 1988: 18) but rather understood dialectically in terms of its semi-peripheral relations within the world-system and how this conditioned popular anti-systemic struggles and discourses as well as governance strategies to contain them, coercively, politically and ideologically. What follows is less a final account than a challenging invitation. Adhering to a spirit of dialectical inquiry, the reader is encouraged to think through this argument's implications "critically and querulously" (See Bookchin 2005: 77) .
Containing Anti-Systemic Movements:
Classic and Social Constitutionalism in Ireland Emerging in 16 th century Europe, the capitalist world-system gradually incorporated Ireland as a semi-periphery within Britain's regional economy (Crotty 1986; O'Hearn 2001) . The late 17 Core-periphery relations were subject to intense contestation. The landlords and their agents emerged as a powerful and relatively autonomous part of the colonising regime, protecting their interests from tenants (and the landless) primarily through their control of the colonial administration at Dublin Castle as well as political alliances at Westminster (Slater and McDonough 2008: 18) . Ensuing "anti-systemic" conflict took both "social" and "national" forms, with the latter proving dominant. While "social" resistance to landlordism took the form of diffuse secret society traditions in the countryside, "national" advocates in urban areas, drawn from both and asserted its authority to intervene in the colonial administration and nationalist politics on behalf of the native population. In return for their support, the bishops expected deference to their "moral monopoly" and, in particular, control over the material means of producing that monopoly among the poor, specifically education, health and charitable services (Inglis 1998: 57) . For the recently created petite bourgeoisie, leaving such services under church control was both pious and cost-effective. By the 1900s then, the country's major property interests, including banks, graziers, railway companies, breweries and dairies, as well as a newly emerged middle stratum of "native"
owners of medium-sized farms, supported reproducing, deepening and accelerating core-periphery linkages within the British regional economy. Meanwhile, the mass of the working population, consisting of small farmers and landless laborers, emigrated or remained "land hungry" in the countryside while a smaller, politically conscious proletariat emerged in the slums of Ireland's main cities. (Kotsonouris 1994) . The challenge to classic legal institutions and norms mounted. Small farmers and landless laborers, concentrated in Connaught and along the Western seaboard, escalated local rent-strikes into widespread cattle-driving and land-grabbing. Graziers favoured the creation of a "White Army" to combat "agrarian Bolshevism" (Lee 1989: 181) .
During the ensuing military conflict with Great Britain (1919-21), social polarization and popular democracy posed a decisive threat to Sinn Féin's capacity to govern. Class conflict, particularly agrarian agitation, threatened to split the IRA's rank and file (Laffan 1995: 253) . The party responded with a mixture of conciliation and coercion. In early 1919, Sinn Féin, with the support of the trade unions and Labor party, announced a radical form of "social" legal thought. The Democratic Programme (1919) declared all rights of private property to be subordinated to the public welfare, assured Irish citizens of "an adequate share of the produce of the Nation's labor" in return for serving the public welfare, and further outlined commitments to welfare state initiatives (Dáil Debates, 21.01.1919) . In practice, however, Sinn Féin insisted on private property rights. Crucially, the party centralized the organic courts and banned their hearing of land disputes.
Property-owners now looked to Dublin, not Westminster, to report expropriation (Casey 1970: 321) .
Westminster, meanwhile, reinforced classic legal institutions and norms. The Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921), concluded at the cessation of armed hostilities between British and Irish forces, represented a classic negotiation of sovereignty between an imperial metropole and national jurists (Kennedy 2006: 50-4) . The Treaty denoted sovereignty in classic legal terms, providing for a stateform with a monopoly on the right to command in its territory (See Lerner 2011: 169) . It further envisaged the reproduction of existing rights of private property and free trade in the Irish Free State, retaining national debt repayments while remaining silent on social issues such as land purchase or the redistribution of large untenanted estates (Dooley 2004: 42) . Under the terms of the Treaty, Sinn Féin would form a Provisional Government, empowered to create a constitution for the new Irish Free State.
Throughout 1922, constitution making occurred as a split in the "national" movement over the Treaty led to civil war. Here too, "social" concerns overlapped. Opposition to the Treaty strongly correlated with poorer areas of high emigration and agrarian radicalism (Pyne 1970) . In addition to Westminster, Irish society's established interests, notably the country's large land and business owners, as well as the Catholic hierarchy and media, supported "constitutional government" and pressed for the re-imposition of "law and order" (Kostick 2009: 180) . Class conflict, including "the recent revival of cattle-driving," and intra-nationalist violence loomed large in constitution makers' minds (UCDA P4/320). In addition to immediate coercive measures, institutional design was deemed crucial to countering revolutionary groups.
Insofar as the Treaty permitted, the government-appointed drafting committee and Col. 494-5, 708; 20.09.1922; Col. 755, 26.09.1922; Col. 697, 25.09.1922 Ultimately, the 1922 Constitution was limited to two "programmatic declarations" only, one specifying a pre-existing right to elementary education and the other providing for state ownership of national resources (Kohn, 1932: 174) . 
Incorporating Anti-Systemic Movements in the 1937 Catholic Social Constitution
Ireland's second constitution making episode occurred during the Great Depression (Arrighi 1994: 277-285; Hobsbawm 1994: 85-109) . Internationally, the decade was characterized by rethinking forms of state or "social" control of the laissez-faire market, primarily in response to mass unemployment (Kennedy 2006: 21-2; Thornhill 2013: 301-3, 317-23) . Among liberal democracies, the social took the form of the Matignon Agreements in France or the New Deal in the United States. Nationalists in Poland, Austria, Hungary, Spain and Portugal used a highly selective form of Catholic corporatist constitutionalism to justify more authoritarian government.
In Italy and Germany, fascist movements introduced a highly coercive system of corporate societal management, achieving full employment while leaving intact the "classic" freedoms of capital. In all cases, social legal thought was proposed to prevent communist alternatives, whether supported by Stalinist Russia or autonomous such as occurred in Republican Spain (Kennedy 2006: 38) .
Ireland did not experience the same extremes of mass unemployment and polarization as in the rest of Europe. Social forms of constitutionalism, however, similarly depended on a politics of "class-abatement" (Marshall 1950: 32) . A range of "national and social" antagonisms Drafted primarily by de Valera with the aid of a select committee of civil servants, the constitution redefined the territory of the new state of "Eire" to include the island of Ireland, asserted the state's legitimacy on the basis of popular sovereignty, removed inherited monarchical legal symbols and emphasized "national" traits such as the Irish language and Christianity. The 1937 Constitution retained its predecessor's conservative institutional design, centralising authority in the executive and representative party at the expense of local government or more direct forms of popular autonomy. Similarly, the text provided for a Supreme Court to interpret its provisions, including a list of classic civil-political rights, notably that of private property.
At the same time, the prominence of conflicts over credit, land, and living standards ensured a much greater crystallization of social constitutional forms than had occurred in 1922 (Murray, 2015b (Lentin, 1998) . Family law proved more amenable to Catholic social influence, however, than market law.
Primarily at the behest of the Department of Finance, who feared such rights would inspire rather than satisfy agitators, Catholic social proposals for land redistribution, welfare provision and social credit were relegated to "directive principles" (article 45) unenforceable in court (UCDA P150/2416). The text framed the state's duty to the "weaker sections" of Irish society in terms of "charity" not justice or equality.
In the subsequent plebiscite, the 1937 Irish Constitution was accepted by a narrow majority of some 56% to 43% ( 
Neoformal Constitutionalism in Ireland and the European Union
The politics of contesting the Irish Constitution thereafter was inextricably world-systemic. PostWorld War Two, Ireland broadly functioned as a semi-periphery, one in which "national" forms of anti-systemic politics took precedence over "social" alternatives, and the population's welfare remained subordinate to the needs of stable, increasingly global capital flows ( In law schools and the wider public sphere, social legal thought remained comparatively underdeveloped. Changing constitutional norms thus depended vitally on citizens taking new rights claims to court and on supportive networks of barristers and civil society groups (Hogan, Barrington and McEntee 1985: 107; Sturgess and Chubb 1988: 420) . Support structures for taking such cases, mirroring the state's low welfare effort, were poorly financed, ensuring advantages to those able to fund cases (O'Morain 2003). Unsurprisingly, Ireland's "rights revolution" was a comparatively conservative one (See Epp 1998).
Farewell to the Catholic Social Constitution
The conservative, nationalist dominated stasis of core-peripheral and anti-systemic relations in the 1950s and 60s occasioned comparatively few changes to the 1937 Irish Constitution, or indeed proposals for amendment (See McMahon 1979) . A contemporary report of a cross-party Constitution Review Committee (1967: 8) , created by Taoiseach Seán Lemass (Fianna Fáil), stated that the group was "not aware of any public demand for a change in the basic structure of the Constitution." The committee did, however, recommend removing certain Catholic confessional provisions, partly in response to changing social mores and partly with a view to furthering diplomatic relations with Northern Ireland's Unionist administration. To this end, in 1972, the government proposed and a majority voted to remove the constitutional provision outlining the "special position" of the Catholic Church. At the same time, faced with the conflicting pressures of tradition and modernization, Lemass privately encouraged liberal judicial appointees to emulate the activist U.S. Supreme Court under Earl Warren (Sturgess and Chubb 1988: 144) . Constitutional change in Ireland, as in the United States, owed partly to an empowered judiciary. Chief Justice Cearbhall Ó'Dálaigh's court of the 1960s newly interpreted the constitution so as to acknowledge the existence of rights not explicitly listed in the constitution (Ryan v Attorney General [1965] ). At least eighteen such "un-enumerated" rights would be identified over the following three decades (Coakley and Gallagher, 2010: 87) . The Supreme Court proved particularly activist regarding the preservation and enlargement of civil liberties, emphasising limits to police powers and rights of due process as well as expanding the private sphere, most notably with regard to the liberalization of Catholic social or family law. In the celebrated McGee [1974] case, the Supreme Court acknowledged an "unenumerated" constitutional right to marital privacy and thereby struck down Catholic "social" laws banning the importation of contraceptives. Thereafter, the spectre of an Irish judge following American precedents to liberalize divorce or abortion legislation mobilized conservative Catholic groups into action.
In market law, the judges retained a classic liberal view of individual rights trumping collective rights or social justice concerns. Judge Hanna's expressed inability to comprehend the meaning of such social constitutional terms as the "common good" or "social justice" would remain the traditional response of jurists trained in the canons of positive law (Pigs Marketing Board v. Donnelly [1939] ). This classic disposition was most apparent in the judiciary's interpretation of the 1937 Constitution's trade union provisions. In NUR [1947] , Educational Company [1961] and Meskell [1973] , the courts prohibited picketing to obtain "closed shop" agreements and further established a low threshold for employers to obtain injunctions to restrain workers' collective action. Thus, while other European countries' legally entrenched corporatist bargaining models over this period the Irish Constitution was used to reverse inherited common law immunities for industrial action (Wilkinson 1989) . Among other factors, the strength of this Anglo-American constitutional model induced trade unions' subsequent acceptance of FF-led social partnership and a restrictive Industrial Relations Act (1990) .
From the 1970s onwards, however, as the crisis of the U.S.-led accumulation cycle deepened, neo-formal fixes increasingly involved national governments relocating majoritarian decision-making to international treaty-based institutions. As neoliberal elites sought to restore profitability by disembedding social reforms, successive Irish governments proved complicit by removing key policy-making instruments, notably monetary policy, from industrial relations and parliamentary arenas in order to insulate these decisions from majoritarian pressures (Hirschl 2007; Mair 2013) . This shifting balance of core-peripheral and anti-systemic relations crystallized in a series of particular changes to the 1937 Irish Constitution. The contested removal of capital from the constraints of "social" development in market law and of society from the "Catholic (Anderson, 2007) .
The size of EU-critical opposition in Ireland is remarkable given that proponents of EU integration encompass the state's three largest political parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and, from the 1980s onwards, Labor) combined with the Irish Famers' Association, the Irish Business Employers'
Confederation, the American Chamber of Commerce, and both state and private media.
Multinational corporations intervened directly in the Lisbon (2009) referendum to advocate a "yes" vote (Kennedy, 2009 Sources: Coakley and Gallagher, 2010: 445-6; www.environ Over the same period, youth, feminist and "minority"-led attempts to remove the Catholic social imprimatur on constitutional issues such as abortion, divorce, homosexuality, adoption and illegitimacy proceeded haltingly. Attempting to win over unionist opinion to improve North-South relations, Fine Gael Taoiseach Garrett FitzGerald proclaimed a "crusade" to remove sectarianism from the Irish Constitution, before bowing to Catholic pressure groups and holding a referendum to prohibit abortion in 1983 (Ferriter 2005: 717-9) . The Fine Gael-Labor government also failed to carry a referendum to legalise divorce in 1986. By the 1990s, however, the countermobilizations of students, feminists, liberals and the wider Left had grown to a majority. In 1992, referendums prompted by court cases constitutionalized a right to leave the state for and to obtain information on abortion. In 1995, the constitutional ban on divorce was narrowly overturned (Table 2) . Sources: Coakley and Gallagher, 2010: 445-6; www.environ.ie. The judiciary's progressive liberalization of Catholic social family law was similarly interrupted. Judicial activism prompted successive Irish governments in the 1970s to make conservative (as opposed to liberal) appointments to the bench, primarily to ensure a tough line on IRA paramilitaries through the Special Criminal Court (Sturgess and Chubb 1988 defending challenged laws criminalising homosexuality (Norris v. Ireland [1988] ). In the X-case [1993] , however, the Supreme Court acknowledged a right to pursue an abortion in strictly limited circumstances where a mother's life was at risk. From that point onwards, possibly in response to the very public contestation of the X-case ruling, the Supreme Court has no longer proved particularly "activist" regarding constitutional interpretation. Strict, literal interpretations of the Constitution, not unlike the emergent "originalist" legal culture in the United States, gained greater support (Coakley and Gallagher 2010: 88) . Groups for choice regarding abortion and for the decriminalization of homosexuality subsequently pursued successful legal actions to the ECHR.
In terms of market law, the Irish Supreme Court continued to strike down social legislation in defence of negative liberties or property rights. Special interest groups, including employers, landlords and farming associations, successfully used the constitution to challenge state regulation of the market place. These cases included successful constitutional challenges to rent restrictions and land taxation measures (Blake [1981] ; Brennan [1983] ; see Keane 1983) . Conversely, responding to claimed socio-economic or "positive" rights, the Supreme Court proved reluctant to impose additional economic costs on the state. Judges, ostensibly distinguishing between "distributive" and "commutative" justice as well as claiming a commitment to the principle of the proposed a referendum to constitutionalize socio-economic rights, the government retained and exercized its veto over this proposal. Social movements, however, notably those currently involved in housing and water privatization struggles, continue to demand socio-economic rights and, in the case of the trade union-led Right2Water (2015), to demand their constitutionalization.
Conclusion
In sum, Bunreacht na hÉireann merits understanding as a world-constitution. Specifically, Ireland's constitutional development had a dialectical relationship to its incorporation into the historical capitalist world-system and to concomitant socio-political struggles over this evolving process. In the period between 1848 and 1945, Ireland resembled postcolonial peripheries insofar as popular, anti-systemic mobilizations adopted "national" rather than "social" trajectories. conservative mode of conceding reforms, notably land redistribution, to preserve the inherited peripheral economy from its worst excesses. Again, similar to other postcolonial peripheries, the "Catholic social" form of constitutionalism adopted in 1937 did not fundamentally change these inherited political institutions, or classic laws of property and contract, but instead prioritized creating a "native" or Catholic family law regime. The Bunreacht similarly envisaged a model of welfare provision based on paternalist charity rather than justice or solidarity.
Ireland's contested incorporation into the historical capitalist world-system and associated constitutional forms, however, depart from a strictly postcolonial interpretation of Irish peripheralization. First, membership of the white, English-speaking Atlantic economy facilitated Ireland's integration into the world-system on increasingly better economic and political terms than other peripheries, particularly from the late 19 th century onwards. Second, to a more pronounced degree than elsewhere, the conciliatory redesign of British-Irish relations, specifically the adoption of electoral and land reforms, created a residual Anglo-Irish and emergent Catholic
Irish middle class of sizeable land-owners, professionals and administrators by the early 20 th century, thoroughly integrated into the "national" (peripheral) economy and, to varying degrees, the state apparatus. Third, unlike in Spanish or French colonies, the Catholic Church had not been popularly identified with the colonising regime, thereby strengthening its moral monopoly throughout the 20 th century, marginalising rival ideologies and legitimating the independent state on the basis of supernatural authority more than popular reason. Together, these long-term factors facilitated a particular form of political stability or quietism unknown to poorer peripheries. In the period between 1945 and 2008, Ireland's changing constitutional forms registered and reproduced more widely experienced, transnational developments. Semi-peripheral reincorporation into a U.S.-led world-system, driven by the expansion of multinational corporations, prompted economic growth, limited industrialization, and fostered an increasingly suburban, consumerist and mass society. An emergent nationalist-populist consensus on liberal economic growth and more liberal values displaced a residual nationalist project of territorial reunification and cultural revival. As in the pre-war era, nationalist dominance owed to the capacities of a reformed comprador class-now centred on multinational service provision, the professions, government and administration-to advance a programme of "national interest" still capable of co-opting small farmers, organized labor and community groups. "Growth" accompanied comparatively modest levels of redistribution through EU-subsidized mass agricultural production, voluntary wage bargaining and gradual welfare state expansion. Anti-systemic movements fragmented. With rapidity from the 1980s onwards, post-68 social, youth and feminist movements' rejection of Catholic social norms governing family and sexuality coalesced with neoliberal governments' removal of "social" limits to the market.
While these developments form part of a more widely shared experience in the worldsystem, certain dynamics or historically specific legacies colored emergent constitutional forms in Ireland. From the 1970s onwards, the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland split the left and reanimated nationalist-confessional politics against the encroaching "liberal agenda." Moreover, the moral authority of the Catholic Church, albeit gradually diminishing, endured into the 1990s, its influence still apparent in the Bunreacht's religious-gendered language and, in particular, the retention of highly restrictive provisions concerning abortion. Nevertheless, in Ireland, as elsewhere, the "national" bourgeoisie, faced with competing pressures of tradition and modernization in market and family law, relocated contentious political issues to the non-majoritarian, expert domains of treaty formation and judicial review, notably those of the European Union.
Emergent neo-formal constitutional forms incorporated legacies of both domination and freedom. The Irish courts generally reproduced classic constitutional forms, emphasising individualism, anti-statism, and "negative liberties" (including private property rights) ahead of communitarian norms, the interests of the "common good" or "positive" rights to welfare. Concomitantly, numerous minoritarian "human rights" conflicts-fought by or on behalf of women, children, prisoners, gays, Travellers, asylum seekers, the disabled and the transgendered among others-have successfully challenged repressive constitutional norms and expanded formal and substantive freedoms. Importantly, the displacement of politics to technocratic legal domains was and remains legitimated by popular actions, not just by majoritarian referendums but also by periodic and significant citizen-initiated court cases.
Today, as the spirit of Davos ushers in a return to classic, laissez-faire jurisprudence in the service of corporate power, it is impossible to tell whether an alternative spirit of Porto Alegre may succeed in creating a more democratic, more egalitarian world. The present analysis suggests three insights for movements acting in the latter spirit. First, it underlines the deep-rooted relationship between state formations, constitutionalism and anti-majoritarian politics, specifically the defence of the rights of propertied minorities from mob-rule or, as the Greeks defined it, "democracy."
Second, it cautions social movements against expecting too much from state forms such as constituent assemblies or public interest litigation strategies as a means of challenging systemic priorities. Progressives cannot abandon political politics for judicial politics (Unger 2009: 111) .
Third and finally, this analysis highlights instead the potentialities of organized movements, premised on direct democracy and direct action, to effect systemic transformations (See Graeber 2013). If pre-existing institutional legacies, including state, constitutional and proto-state formations, may limit or contain these potentialities, moments of world-systemic rupture, such as occurred in 1917 or 1968, can enhance them in altogether new, unexpected and inspiring ways.
The possibility of moving against and beyond anti-democratic constitutionalism, as ever, depends on us.
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